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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPERFICIAL TREATMENT OF THIS CASE 
IS A GRAVE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE 
This is not Robert DeBryfs case. Nor is this Dayle 
Jeff's case. Nor is this Judge Bench's case. No lawyer or 
judge should have a false pride in winning the case; or in 
losing the case; or in writing an opinion; or in changing an 
opinion. Presumably, the attorneys on both sides, as well as 
the entire panel of judges, have a jo^nt goal of seeking jus-
tice . 
This is Ralph Ostler's case. Ralph Ostler lost half 
his body -- from the waist down. Hd deserves a thoughtful, 
informed, reasoned analysis by each judge. Unfortunately, that 
is not what he got. What Ralph Ostler got was a superficial 
Opinion that did not even touch on the 
spend his lifetime in a wheelchair. Surely his case merits a 
few extra hours of time by the judges. 
Because of the superficial treatment of issues in this 
case, Ostler has employed an expert to determine whether the 
decision making process has broken dcbwn in this case. The 
experts opinion is attached as Exhibit |A. 
core issues. Ralph will 
Ostler's expert is chairperson of the Department of 
Philosophy at the University of Utah. Plaintiff's expert has 
rated the quality of this Court's Opinion as a D or E grade. 
This is not intended to criticize or embarrass the Court. 
Rather, this is an attempt to assist the Court from committing 
a grave injustice. Hopefully the Court will be inclined to 
thank counsel, rather than to retaliate. 
POINT II 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT 
FAILED TO FOLLOW BINDING AND RECENT PRECEDENT 
FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
A major issue in the case was that Ostler's expert was 
not permitted to testify on the "moth phenomenon." The trial 
court reasoned that such testimony was not admissible until a 
foundation could be laid that father Ostler was awake just 
prior to the accident. (See Brief of Appellant at p. 6.) This 
court echoed the trial court's reasoning: 
[T]he theory was premised on the fact that a 
driver must be awake in order to be so "lured" 
. . . without this foundation, the Court deter-
mined that the expert testimony would not be 
helpful to the jury . . . 
Slip Opinion, at p. 4. 
However, this Court overlooked the recent case of 
Huddleston v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed 2d 771 
(1988) : 
2 
In determining whether the government has 
introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 
104(b), the trial court neitheJ: weighs credibi-
lity nor makes a finding thai the government 
has proved the conditional fact by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. The cjourt simply ex-
amines all the evidence and decides whether the 
jury could reasonably find the conditional 
fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(Compare, Brief of Appellant at p. 6 & 7.) 
In this case, there was abundant evidence from which 
the jury could have concluded that fjather Ostler was awake. 
(See, Brief of Appellant at p. 4 & 5.) Contrary to Huddleston, 
the trial court did not permit the evidence of the preliminary 
fact issue to go to the jury. Nor did the trial court apply 
the Huddleston analysis. (viz, whether the jury could reason-
ably find from the evidence that father Ostler was awake.) 
This is not a matter of discretion. Huddleston must be applied 
to the facts of this case. 
POINT III 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE +HIS COURT FAILED 
TO FOLLOW BINDING RECENT PRECEDENT FROM 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
A second major issue in the <pase was that defendant 
Wheeler had misstated the law in his (closing argument. (See 
generally, Brief of Appellant at p. 33\) This Court's Opinion 
holds that any error was cured by the fpllowinq comments of the 
judge: 
3 
The jury is directed to look at the instruc-
tions. They set forth the law in that regard. 
Statement of counsel is to be disregarded 
except as it is accurate. 
Slip Opinion, at p. 8. 
However; this Court's Opinion was absolutely silent on 
the issue of whether such a statement was sufficient to cure 
the error. Strangely, this Court's Opinion relies upon Halford 
v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. App. 1977). However, Halford, 
squarely holds that such comments by the Court are not suffi-
cient to cure the error. 
More importantly, this Court's Opinion totally ignores 
the recent Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Shickles, 760 
P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). (See discussion at Brief of Appellant at 
p. 35 & 36.) A proper application of the Shickles case should 
have led to a reversal. 
POINT IV 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT 
HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THREE SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS 
IN THE COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Ostler challenged the Court's instruction on indepen-
dent intervening cause on four grounds: first, failure to 
define the term intervening independent cause; second, that 
foreseeability is only one test (not the sole test) to deter-
mine causation; third, that only a generalized risk of harm 
4 
need be foreseeable; and fourth, contusion. (See generally, 
Brief of Appellant at p. 56-58,) 
This Court's Opinion deals onljy with the fourth issue: 
viz. confusion- Rehearing is necessary to analyze the other 
three defects in the jury instructions J* 
With respect to the fourth issue, this Court ruled that 
the confusion was not "substantial or prejudicial". In Harris 
v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), the Su-
preme Court reversed, in part, upon the confusion of an in-
struction on superceding cause. It is obvious that the Utah 
Supreme Court regards confusion regarding superceding cause to 
be serious enough for reversal. 
POINT V 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT'S OPINION 
FAILED TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF LIABILITY 
There were two theories of liab 
First, that Wheeler was unlawfiil 
of the road in violation of §41-6-103(1 
pointed out, that theory was conceded 
p.lity: 
ly parked on the side 
|)(i). As this Court has 
Ibv the defense, and the 
1
 It is true that the Court diet 
concurrent negligence. (Slip opinion p, 
rent negligence does not "fill the gap." 
concurrent negligence does not inform t{he 
line between concurrent cause and intervening 
instruct the jury on 
9.) However, concur-
The instruction on 
jury of the dividing 
cause. 
5 
Court directed a verdict on liability (but reserved on proxi-
mate cause). 
The second theory of liability was that Wheeler was 
parked on a controlled access highway for more than 10 minutes. 
This theory was not conceded. 
However, this Court has failed to appreciate that the 
chain of causation is different depending upon which theory of 
liability applies. Thus, a truck parked for less than 10 min-
utes must simply turn on blinking lights. But a truck parked 
for more than 10 minutes must additionally put out flares or 
triangles. (See generally, Brief of Appellant at p. 12.) 
Ostler's expert exclaimed that flares and triangles offer an 
additional measure of protection for the passing motorist and 
that the accident could have been avoided if this additional 
warning had been in place. (Transcript, 232-233, 284.) In 
short, the absence of flares is an additional basis for proxi-
mate cause. This Court's Opinion simply overlooked this 
second theory of liability. 
POINT VI 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE COURT 
HAS OVERLOOKED RESTATEMENT 442 AND 447 
This Court glossed over the claim for a directed ver-
dict by saying that it was a jury issue. However, our Supreme 
6 
Court has adopted Section 442 of the Restatement^. If this 
Court also accepts Section 447 of the Restatement, there is no 
jury issue. The result must follow as a matter of logic. In-
deedf the illustration of Section 447 of the Restatement is 
very similar to this case: 
A loads his truck so carelessly that a slight 
jolt might cause its heavy contents to fall 
from it. He parks it in a street where to his 
knowledge small boys congregate for play. Bf 
one of the boysf tries to climb on the truck. 
In so doingf he disturbs the load as he causes 
a heavy article to fall upon and hurt C, a 
comrade standing close by. Bfs act is not a 
superseding cause of C's harm. 
Reply Brief of Appellant at Appendix TWo. 
To dispose of Ostler's motion for a directed verdict 
without analyzing the interplay between Section 442 and 447 of 
the Restatement is grossly superficial. 
si DATED this cyC/ day of _M^U>Wxy*S<--> 1989. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2
 Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 219 
(Utah 1983). 
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EXHIBIT A 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, ] 
Plaint i f f , ] 
vs. ] 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. ] 
OF &R ROE, INC., and ] 
STANLEY E.WHEELER, ] 
Defendants. ' 
I AFFldAVIT OF 
• PATRICIA HANNA 
) Case No. 88-00228-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
My name is Patricia Hanna. I give the following testimony under 
oath: 
1. I hold a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati. 
2. I am chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the 
University of Utah. 
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3. I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law. However, I am trained 
in logic and argumentation. Indeed, the field of philosophy is in large 
measure devoted to the study of arguments and the process of analytic 
reasoning. I have taught classes in deductive and inductive logic, as well 
as in epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scientific inquiry. My 
curriculum vita is attached. 
4. I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to read the Opinion of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Ostler v. Albina. et al. I have been asked to 
render an opinion of that Opinion. Since I am not an attorney, I have not 
been asked to determine if the Opinion is right or wrong. Rather, I have 
been asked to determine the extent to which the Opinion fairly analyzes 
issues raised in the briefs. 
5. I have read the briefs of both parties, the Opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, and I have had trial transcripts available for cross-checking. 
6. In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision 
making process. If this Opinion had been written by one of my 
undergraduate students as an exercise in a course, I would have given it a 
grade of 'D;' from a graduate student, it would have counted as failing 
work. 
7. In my opinion, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion could 
have been endorsed by three judges. Due to time pressures or 
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at 
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems 
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors 
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a 
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they 
deserved and required. 
8. My detailed analysis of the Court's Opinion follows: 
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General Structure of Appeal 
There is an underlying argument in the appeal which ties together 9 
of the initial 11 points in the Appellant's Substitute Brief (Points I, II, III, 
IV, V, VII, IX, X and XI); without an understanding of this argument, the 
merit of these points cannot be properly assessed or appreciated. In 
addition, Point VI is substantively affected by the issues involved in the 
above mentioned 9 points.1 Unless the appeal is viewed in terms of the 
unifying argument, it is in my judgment impossible to appreciate its full 
force. 
In the very roughest terms, the underlying argument comes to this. 
The case of Ralph Ostler (hereafter, Ostler) against Stanley Wheeler 
(hereafter, Wheeler)ef al. cannot be resolved without a decision on the 
issues of proximate cause, superseding intervening independent cause and 
division of liability. In order for the jury to reach a reasoned conclusion 
on these issues, it would have to be given access to certain facts and/or 
scientifically or factually based theories, and to be given a clear 
presentation of the law as it bears on these ispues; in the absence of such 
access, either the jury could not fulfill its responsibility or it should have 
been given a directed verdict against Wheeler on causation, and asked only 
to determine the extent of Wheeler's liability] 
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment 
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the interrelated 
nature of the arguments in the appeal; if each point is taken individually 
and out of context, it is impossible to reach a sound judgment on the 
plaintiff's case. Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no 
appreciation of the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a 
bearing on more than one aspect of the case. This is most evident in the 
case of negligence and proximate cause. While it might be understandable 
1
 The Appellate Court makes no ruling on this aspect of the appeal, and hence offers no 
argumentation supporting its de facto denial of the appeal. This seems a significant omission 
given that the point is discussed in the Appellant's Substitute Brief on pp. 38-40, and in the 
Reply Brief on pp. 45-48. 
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that the trial judge, under the various time constraints and pressures 
imposed by an on-going trial, might fail to appreciate this point, one 
would suppose that the appeals process is in part intended to correct for 
this by allowing three judges who have more time and distance to reflect 
on the matter. This does not seem to have been the case; consequently, I 
can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a serious 
breakdown in the present case. 
In what follows, I shall indicate how this argument is made and 
sustained throughout the documentation presented to the Court of Appeals 
on Ralph Ostler's behalf, and indicate how and where the Court of Appeals' 
decision to reject the appeal fails to take account of or the address the 
points raised by Ostler's counsel. I shall comment only on the 9 points 
involved in the argument, and the judgments reached on these points. 
Assumptions 
There is no dispute on the following: Wheeler negligently parked his 
semi-truck in the emergency lane on 1-15 between Santaquin and Payson, 
Utah. He failed to set out flashers or triangles marking the presence of 
his truck, and at @ 2:00 a.m. (P.S.T.), Stephen Ostler's (hereafter father 
Ostler) pick-up truck, with Ostler asleep in the bed of the truck, ran into 
the back of Wheeler's truck. Throughout, I will take these as. given. 
Point I 
This contains the clearest statement of the general argument of the 
appeal, and sets the stage for what follows. It is argued that although a 
major portion of the trial revolved around the issue of proximate cause, 
almost all of the evidence proffered by Ostler was rejected by the trial 
court. As a result, when the trial court refused to direct a verdict against 
Wheeler on the issue of causation, on the grounds that it is a matter of 
fact which should properly be determined by the jury (Point XI), the jury 
had seen none of the evidence which Ostler considered relevant this 
decision. 
In the absence of clear proof that this evidence lacked all merit, 
this creates a serious problem for both procedural and substantive 
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fairness. In rejecting Ostler's evidence, the trial court gives either no 
indication that the reason for denying the jury access to the evidence was 
that the evidence was entirely without merit.2 Instead, the evidence is 
rejected on at least one of three grounds: 1. because it was held to be 
irrelevant to the issue of proximate causation, 2. because it was felt that 
it would confuse the jurors, and 3. because it was felt that the jurors 
already were fully aware of the phenomena. The aDDeal argues that these 
grounds are all inadequate.3 
1. The "moth-phenomenon". Wheeler's failure to use emergency devices. 
and denial of presentation of 're-created' accident without truck in 
emergency lane 
The evidence related to the moth phenomenon consists in a theory, 
which is said to be widely recognized, that at night tail-lights, whether 
flashing or not, have a tendency to "lure" sleepy drivers towards them, 
much as a moth is drawn to a light. Thus, if father Ostler was awake at 
the time of the accident, Wheeler's tail-lights might have exerted this 
"luring" effect on him, causing him to drive into the back of Wheeler's 
truck. 
In the case of the emergency devices, flares and/or triangles, Ostler 
was not allowed to introduce into evidence expert testimony that had such 
devices been in place, the accident would most likely have been avoided. 
One of the expert witnesses "re-created" the accident at the exact 
location, and concluded on the basis of this recreation that if the truck 
had not been present in the emergency lane, it was most likely that the 
Ostler pick-up would have rolled unharmed into a field. 
2
 At one point counsel for the defense raises a question about the qualifications of Mr. Hulbert to 
testify on the matter of the so-called "moth-phenomenon;" however, it is clear from the 
transcript of the trial that any alleged lack of expertise had nothing to do with the trial judge's 
decision to reject the evidence (Transcript of Trial, p. 245). 
I have regrouped the sub-points under I according to their logical connections. 
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In all three cases the evidence was rejected on the grounds that it 
would not be helpful to the jury, because it was not clear whether father 
Ostler was awake or asleep. Taking each point in isolation, might give 
this a reasonable appearance; however, taking them in isolation overlooks 
the fact that Ostler is trying to present a larger argument, which will be 
explained below, and that Ostler also proposed introducing evidence to 
support the claim that father Ostler was awake, but drowsy, at the time 
of the accident. 
2. Was father Ostler awake? 
The next pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court concern 
whether or not father Ostler was awake; if the appropriateness of the 
moth phenomenon, Wheeler's failure to place emergency devices and the 
pertinence of the re-created accident are all dependent on the answer to 
the question whether father Ostler was awake, it would seem reasonable 
to allow the jury to deliberate on the evidence relating to this matter. 
However, the trial court ruled that because the evidence was not decisive 
(or conclusive) it was inappropriate. 
Ostler cites Rule 104(b) and interpretations of it to support his 
claim that this ruling was based on a misinterpretation of the law. As a 
legal layman, it seems to me that the case is this: Rule 104(b) says that 
if the evidence strong enough to give prima facie support to a judgment 
that something is or is not the case, the trial court should allow the jury 
to hear that evidence and reach its own decision. In the case at hand, the 
trial court denied the jury access to the evidence on the grounds that the 
evidence was not conclusive. It strikes me that if indeed this were the 
standard, there would be precious little for a jury ever to deliberate; all 
the evidence they would ever be given would be such that "no reasonable 
mind could disagree" and one might suppose all juries would ever hear 
would be directed verdicts. 
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic of 
Ostler's point here in denying the appeal. In its decision the Court of 
Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal. What attention it 
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does give falls victim to the same mistake made by the trial court, saying 
only that "Plaintiff's own expert admitted that there was no conclusive 
way to determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the 
accident" (Opinion, p. 4). In light of Ostler's point, this statement is 
simply beside the point and seems to be completely out of context. 
3. Wheeler's violation of the 10-. 15- and 70- hour rules 
Ostler attempted to introduce evidence showing that Wheeler was in 
violation of several federal regulations governing interstate truck 
drivers; in the case at hand, the point of this evidence was to show that 
Wheeler was exhausted at the time he stopped in the emergency lane. The 
relevance of Wheeler's exhaustion is two-fold. One, it contributes to his 
negligence; the decision to rule it out because negligence was not 
relevant, having been determined in a directed verdict, is reasonable. 
However, it also relates to the issues of proximate cause and liability. 
Exhaustion contributes to an exercise of poor judgment; given Wheeler's 
position and responsibilities, evidence that he was exhausted would 
affect whether and to what extent he should be held liable. Further, if 
Wheeler stopped in the emergency lane because he was exhausted and 
needed to urinate as a consequence of drinking too much coffee in an 
attempt to stay awake, this would have a bearing on his culpability. The 
Court of Appeals comments only that this (like all the other issues) "goes 
to the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously decided by 
directed verdict, and may be excluded as irrelevant. See Utah R. Evid. 402 
("evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.")" (Opinion, p. 6). 
4. The purpose of the emergency lane, foreseeabilitv of possibility of 
such an incident in designing highways, and Wheeler's foreseen such a 
possibility 
Ostler tried to introduce expert testimony relating to these issues 
to show that, as an interstate truck driver. Wheeler was 1) aware of the 
intended use of emergency lanes, 2) instructed not to use them unless 
there was a bona fide emergency because of Ijheir intended function (to 
provide a buffer zone for straying vehicles to make corrections within, 
showing that it was foreseen by highway designers that vehicles would 
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occasionally leave the road surface and stray into the emergency lane), 
and 3) capable himself of foreseeing that such a thing might happen. 
Insofar as foreseeability is relevant to proximate cause, this 
evidence clearly is related to that issue. It was disallowed on the grounds 
that it only related to negligence, and that all these matters were 
"common knowledge." The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling. 
This is a mistake on two grounds, 1) because it fails to take account of 
the fact that one circumstance may relate to more than one issue,in this 
case the circumstances are relevant both to negligence and to proximate 
cause; and 2) because Ostler argues that these issues are not common 
knowledge. 
Admissibility of this evidence 
Ostler argues that all this evidence was relevant to the case and 
should have been admitted. In order to see that this is so, one needs to 
understand the argument which Ostler offers to the Court of Appeals in 
order to support his contention that Wheeler was negligent, one of the 
proximate causes of his injury and, therefore, liable. 
This type of argument is called a constructive dilemma; it is a well-
understood and valid form of argument.4 
1. Either father Ostler was awake or asleep at the time of the 
accident. 
2. If he was awake, then Wheeler's truck exerted a luring effect on 
him, causing him to veer off the road; in the absence of flashers or 
triangles, Wheeler's truck was one of the proximate causes of the 
accident (father Ostler's driving itself being the other), and Wheeler is 
therefore liable for the accident. 
4
 According to William Kneale and Martha Kneale. The Development of Logic (London: 1962), 
dilemma has been recognized as a valid mode of argumentation since the second century A.D., 
when it appears in the writings of Hermogenes (p. 178). 
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3. If, on the other hand, father Ostler was asleep, then while there 
was no luring effect, Wheeler's truck parked in the emergency lane 
without flashers or triangles still remains as one of the proximate causes 
of the accident. Had the truck not been there, there would have been no 
accident. Again, Wheeler is liable as one of the proximate causes. 
4. Therefore, regardless of whether father Ostler was awake or 
asleep, Wheeler's parking his truck in the emergency lane stands as a 
proximate cause of the accident, and consequently Wheeler is at least 
partially liable for the accident.5 
To argue that taken piece-by-piece the evidence would not be helpful 
to the jury and to exclude it on that ground is prejudicial since it 
prevented- Ostler's constructing this argument; further.to argue that each 
piece of evidence is disallowed because it relates to negligence and 
negligence is not an issue, is to take too narrpw a view of the nature of 
events. Many features of the world are relevant to different aspects of 
our lives. For example, the fact that the sky is blue is surely relevant 
(pertains) to the artist trying to paint a landscape, but this does not make 
it irrelevant to the astronomer trying to explain the nature of our 
atmosphere and light's reaction to it. So too, the fact that all the 
evidence had a bearing on negligence did not ipso facto render it 
ineligible for consideration by the jury in connection with the issue of 
proximate cause. This is especially so given the fact that the issue of 
proximate cause was the key to the decision. The Court of Appeals' 
decision shows absolutely no appreciation of this fact, and in no sense 
addresses it. Indeed the already quoted passage on p. 6 of the Opinion 
clearly demonstrates this. 
5
 A similar argument can be constructed to show that whether father Ostler was awake or 
asleep, emergency devices would have most likely avoided the accident. Had the emergency 
devices been in place, then if father Ostler was asleep, running over the triangles would most 
likely have awakened him, thus avoiding the accident; had he not been asleep, the devices would 
have alerted him to the truck and allowed him to avoid at the accident. With the devices, the 
accident would have been avoidable; therefore, whether father Ostler is awake or asleep at the 
time of the accident, the truck without emergency devices in place, is one of the proximate 
causes of the accident. 
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Further, in several instances the evidence was ruled out on the 
grounds that the jury already knew everything being discussed; afterall, 
they had driven of interstate highways, driven at night, etc. Ostler 
presents strong evidence that under one, and perhaps the most relevant, 
standard of admissibility of expert testimony, the trial judge misapplied 
the law and held Ostler's witnesses to too high a standard. The Court of 
Appeals simply endorses the trial court's ruling, and had no discussion of 
Ostler's arguments against this decision. 
The common law standard allows expert testimony to be excluded if 
it concerns information which in within the common knowledge of the 
jury. Under this standard, since we all can understand the use of 
emergency lanes (and no doubt at one time read a description of them) and 
since we can understand the "moth phenomenon" and no doubt relate it to 
personal experiences, there is no need for experts to tell us about them. 
However, under Rule 702 which supersedes the common law standard, this 
requirement is relaxed. It is now no longer necessary to show that the 
expert knows something that the jury doesn't know, all that is necessary 
is that the expert be able to make the facts perspicuous to the jury and 
that the expert's testimony not prejudge the case. 
Rule 702 states 
If scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise. (Emphasis added.) 
Under Rule 702, an expert can be employed if 
his testimony will be helpful to the trier of 
fact in understanding evidence that is simply 
difficult [though] not beyond ordinary 
understanding. 
United States v. Downing. 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd 
Cir. 1985) (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 18). 
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In the case at hand, Ostler argues that the jury was fully capable of 
understanding all the excluded evidence, but that it was essential to have 
that evidence placed clearly before them. Specifically: 1) Members of 
the jury may all have been sleepy drivers at one time, but this does not 
entail that they all know about the moth phenomenon or how it operates so 
as to cause a merely sleepy driver to leave the road in a fashion one might 
think possible only for driver who was in fact asleep. 2) There is no 
reason to suppose that the jurors knew about the different reactions 
caused in a sleepy driver by steady tail-lights, blinking tail-lights, and 
flares; or how these reactions can affect the outcome in a situation like 
that at issue. 3) It is unclear that the average driver actually 
understands the intended function of an emergency lane (indeed causal 
observation might indicate that it is perfectly clear that they do not). 4) 
Nor is there any antecedent reason to think that the average juror has the 
slightest idea that interstate truckers are held, by federal regulation, to 
significantly higher standards than are ordinary drivers. 
In the present case of most of the evidehce at hand, not only did the 
jury need to have it made clear (as Rule 702 allows), but it is 
overwhelmingly likely that they needed simply to be make aware of it (as 
the higher common law standard requires). Not knowing these facts has a 
clear impact on the decision concerning foreseeability on Wheeler's part, 
and on a judgment of Wheeler's liability. 
Yet the trial judge disallowed this testimony all on the grounds that 
no expertise was needed to understand it. The Court of Appeals argues 
that in the absence of proof on Ostler's part that this omission was 
substantive an prejudicial, it can see no basis of overturning the trial 
judge's ruling. It is admitted by all parties th^t the trial judge has wide 
discretion in such matters; and that to overrule the trial judge's decision 
without exceptional evidence for doing so would defeat the purpose of this 
discretion. 
However, this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's 
case it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to comprehend 
the nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did to Ostler's case. 
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The Court of Appeals sees only one form which an exceptional case could 
take: each and every piece of evidence taken in isolation would by itself 
make or break the case. However, as indicated above, Ostler's argument is 
not an atomistic one; it is an organic or cumulative argument. In denying 
Ostler's evidence, the Court denied Ostler the chance to tell his side of the 
story, and consequently denied the jury a viable alternative upon which to 
make an essentially comparative judgment. 
Since no one knew whether father Ostler was awake or asleep, or 
whether or not Wheeler was exhausted and functioning below the minimum 
standard to which he is held, the jury had to make a "best case" call with 
only one case available. In short, the jury was to make a comparative 
ruling when the available alternatives consist of only one case (comparing 
A to nothing). In such a case, all the jury had to go on in reaching its 
decision was whether Wheeler's story made sense; since they had no 
alternative account of the situation, they could not compare that story 
with another sensible story to see if one was a better account of what 
happened. Having concluded that Wheeler's story was coherent, as it is, 
the jury had no alternative but to rule against Ostler. If they had been. 
allowed access to Ostler's evidence, in virtue of the form of the new 
deliberation (comparing A to B, where A and B are two different 
scenarios), the decision drawn might have been different. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision that Ostler does not prove 
a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to me to show a 
failure to read the briefs carefully. 
Point II and Point III 
Restricted cross-examination of Wheeler concerning search for a place to 
urinate 
Wheeler's violation of federal regulations (10-. 15-. and 70- hour rules^ 
was intended to offer evidence of impeachment bv bad act 
Both concern Ostler's attempt to impeach Wheeler's testimony. The 
trial judge disallowed the lines of questioning on the ground that it 
related only to negligence and negligence was irrelevant. Ostler's claim is 
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that this is a mistake because they relate to proximate cause and 
liability. The Court of Appeals offers nothing new on this, falling back 
once again on the stand that if an issue is related to negligence, it is 
appropriately excluded. There is no evidence that the Court of Appeals 
appreciates this argument for the dual nature of the testimony. 
Point IV 
Misstatements during closing defendant's closing statement 
In closing remarks, the defendant's counsel stated that the issue 
was not whether Wheeler could have foreseen that a driver might at some 
time run off the road into the emergency lane, but whether he could have 
foreseen that Ostler (or someone else) would have runoff the road into his 
truck at just that time. 
[T]he foreseeability question is: How was Stan 
Wheeler expected to foresee that at that precise 
time, if as Mr. DeBry said, one in a billion chances 
that it would happen right at that particular time-
quoted in Opinion, p. 8). 
This clearly is not the standard to foreseeability; if it were, no one would 
ever be able to foresee anything. 
Ostler objected, and the only response 6f the trial judge was to 
direct the juror's to their instructions. He did not rule on the objection, 
clearly leaving the misstatement uncorrected . In some cases this might 
have caused no harm; however in the case at hand, Ostler argues that it 
causes harm. The problem with simply directing the jurors's attention to 
the instructions is that the instructions themselves are unclear, 
complicated and difficult to understand. This will be discussed in more 
detail under Point X below. 
In the Court of Appeals' ruling, this objection is treated together 
with Point V. The Court of Appeals notes that the jury was directed to its 
instructions, and says that taken in context, the remark caused no harm. 
This decision and the reasoning behind it reflects the Court of Appeals' 
failure to take the misstatement and its correction in context, viz. the 
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larger context of the legal issues involved in the jury's deliberations and 
the fact that their instructions on these matters were unclear and 
confusing. 
Point V 
Who Pays 
This is related to Point IV since it concerns another misleading 
statement made during closing. Here there is only an implication that the 
defendants would have to pay out of their own pockets; hence it is less 
clearly misleading than in the case of Point IV where the misinformation 
was clearly stated. The Court of Appeals' ruling on this point seems well 
taken; unfortunately because Point IV was treated in conjunction with 
this, the ruling on Point V seems to have been misapplied to Point IV. 
Point VII 
Jury given incorrect instructions on Wheeler's duty to set out flares or 
triangles 
Wheeler admitted that he didn't set out the emergency devices; I.C.C. 
regulations requiring that they be set out were read to jury. 
Whenever a vehicle is stopped upon the shoulder of 
a highway from any cause other than necessary 
traffic stops, the driver shall as soon as possible, 
but in any even within 10 minutes, place warning 
devices [flares or reflective triangles] (I.C.C. rule, 
quoted in Appeal, p. 41). 
Therefore, it is clear that Wheeler had a duty to set out the 
devices. However, the jury was clearly instructed that this was not so. 
Instead they were told that the regulations required that the devices be 
set out only if the driver was parked for 10 minutes or longer QL, if parked 
less than 10 minutes, depending on circumstances. 
However if you find that defendant Wheeler was 
parked for less than 10 minutes, it is for you to 
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determine whether or not Wheeler should 
nevertheless have set out the flares or triangles 
under the existing circumstances (appeal p. 42). 
This clearly states that whether a trucK driver has to set out the 
emergency devices when stopped for less than 10 minutes is up to the 
driver's judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that this instruction, even 
i i substantially incorrect, did not do any harm because it relates only to 
negligence. Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal. 
Ostler's point is that the I.C.C. regulation makes it clear that 
truckers are held to higher standards than are ordinary drivers, e.g., 
putting on the truck's blinkers is simply not enough; therefore, even if the 
judge's interpretation of the rule as it applied in the present case were 
correct (viz., that truckers have leeway in deciding when they need to 
place emergency devices out when they are stopped), failure to make the 
actual rule clear was prejudicial against Ostler since it allowed Wheeler 
to be judged by the lower standards of safety applicable to ordinary 
drivers. 
Further, it is not to the point to say that failure to set out warning 
devices is related to negligence; of course it is. The point, once again, is 
that it is also related to proximate cause; on that ground it should have 
been stated clearly and correctly. It does not help the Court of Appeals' 
judgment to point out that earlier in the instructions, the I.C.C. regulation 
was stated correctly. In view of the misstatement, the jury was simply 
left with two conflicting statements, both dealing with w highly relevant 
matter, and no direction on how to resolve that conflict. 
Point IX 
Video tape demonstration 
A video was prepared by an expert witness to help the jury decide 
the issues of proximate cause and superseding intervening cause. Since 
these decisions require jurors to decide what would have happened if the 
"cause" (Wheeler's truck's being parked in the emergency lane) had not 
been there, it is apparent that the jurors are asked to determine the truth 
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of a counterfactual (a "contrary to the facts" or a "what if" case). The 
idea is to see what was contributed to the situation by the negligent act; 
one asks, "but for [the parked truck] what would have transpired?" or 
"what if the truck hadn't been there; what would have happened then?" 
Such determinations are notoriously difficult; therefore, it is hard to see 
how a video showing a scene very much like what seems likely to have 
obtained at the time of the accident, but without the truck in the 
emergency lane, could have been anything but helpful. 
The trial court disallowed the video on two grounds. First, that the 
video did not meet the requirements of a re-enactment; it was not similar 
enough to the incident to count as a re-enactment. Second, that it was 
just "speculation" ( Opinion, p. 5), and as such would not help the jury. 
The second is either misguided, or if not misguided then such as to 
call for a through-going revision of legal standards. In deciding these 
issues one has no option other than to engage in "speculation;" had the 
truck in fact not been there, there would be facts to consider, but then 
there would be no case requiring a decision. If the reason for disallowing 
the video is jury confusion, then again it seems that one will no longer be 
allowed to ask juries to make this sort of determination since it is the 
determination itself, not the video, that is confusing. 
Therefore, everything rests on the first ground; and this is in fact 
the ground most discussed by the Court of Appeals. Here Ostler argues 
that the standard of similarity applies only to re-enactments, where an 
attempt is made to come as close as possible to duplicating the actual 
accident. In such a case, similarity would be very relevant and should be 
taken very seriously. However, this was not the intention in this case. 
Here it is apparent and unargued that the video depicted a scene that could 
llfli have occurred on the night father Ostler ran into Wheeler's truck; the 
point of the video is illustrative, to aid the jury in reaching a decision on 
the issue of proximate cause. 
In ruling on the appeal, the Court of Appeals applied a three-prong 
test: relevance, similarity and non-confusing. It decided that the video 
failed the first two. It then considered the argument that the video was 
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not a re-enactment, but an illustration; and upheld the trial court's ruling 
on the ground that Ostler did not show that disallowing it did any harm or 
that the trial court abused its discretion. 
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point. The very nature 
of decision of proximate cause and superseding intervening causes is by 
its nature confusing. In view of the vast body of evidence already denied 
the jury for its deliberations, it is difficult to make a case for the claim 
that showing them the video would be confusing. At this stage of the trial 
the video tape was the only hope Ostler had of making the point that 
Wheeler's truck was not simply something for father Ostler's truck to hit 
(as though he would have hit something else or rolled over if it hadn't been 
there), but that but for Wheeler's truck there vyould have been no accident 
of the sort that occurred. The video makes the point that Ostler's injuries 
are not causally overdetermined,6 but that Wheeler's truck is a necessary 
causal factor. Both the trial judge and the Cojurt of Appeals fail to see 
this point. 
Point X 
Court's instructions on intervening causes was incorrect. 
Ostler objected on several points: 
1. "Intervening independent cause" was unaeTinea. 
2. Foreseeability was not the only test of causation 
3. Precise accident rather than general sort of accident was held to 
be the standard of foreseeability. 
4. The instructions were confusing. 
6
 If something is causally overdetermined, it will occur whether or not one of the causes 
occurs. For example, if I have taken an overdoes of sleeping pills and after I take them you 
fatally shoot me, we can say that my death was causally overdetermined. Keeping the shooting 
constant, even if I don't take the pills, I die; keeping the pills constant, even if you don't shoot 
me, I die. 
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The Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the 
corrections would have been more confusing than the instructions as 
given, that the contested instructions concern negligence and were 
therefore harmless because irrelevant, and that Ostler offers no proof 
that the instructions resulted in a substantive and prejudicial opinion. 
This decision one again fails to take account of dual nature of some 
of the evidence, as well as failing to take account of the context in which 
the instructions were given and the evidence available to the jury. The 
jury was to make a decision on an issue without being allowed to hear 
Ostler's side of the issue (see Point I). Taken in this context, Ostler's 
case that it is overwhelmingly likely that the jury's ultimate decision 
was influenced adversely by these confusing and misleading instructions 
is much stronger than the Court of Appeals' reasoning indicates. 
PQint XI 
Directed verdict on causation 
Perhaps the main thrust of this appeal is that the jury was asked to 
deliberate and decide on an issue, proximate cause, on which they were 
given none of Ostler's evidence and on which the instructions from the 
judge were unclear and confusing. In view of this it seems at least 
unreasonable to ask the jury to reach a decision on the matter; however, in 
the case at hand the error runs even deeper. 
Ostler asked for a directed verdict on causation on the grounds that 
the trial court's earlier directed verdict on negligence implied a similar 
verdict on causation. The defendant's response claims that if this were 
allowed to stand, it would be tantamount to equating negligence and 
causation; this is simply not so. Ostler argues only that in this case is 
there an implication from negligence to causation; this does not imply 
that there is such an implication in every case. 
For example, I might park negligently with respect to the wild 
animals in Yellowstone but not be a proximate cause of your running into 
my car and causing yourself serious injury, if, for example, I am parked 
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next to a 300 ft. drop-off which you would have plummeted over in any 
case. The case at hand is not of this sort. He!re the negligence implies 
causation. This is shown by asking what it was that made the act of 
parking in the emergency lane negligent. The answer is two-fold: 1) risk 
to a class of persons which included Ostler and 2) subjecting Ostler to 
the hazard which lead to his injury (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 60). 
Thus, causation is implied by negligence. 
The realization of the hazard was brought about by father Ostler's 
driving, but that does not negate the fact that Wheeler's parking in the 
emergency lane is a proximate cause of that injury. The standards cited 
by Ostler clearly support this contention.7 
Ostler goes on to argue that in this case the standard for a directed 
verdict is met: reasonable minds cannot disagree. They cannot disagree 
because the answer follows by definition from the earlier verdict. In the 
Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 62, Ostler makes this clear: " The fact 
that reasonable minds could not differ on proximate cause is illustrated 
by the following question: What risks of harm (other than accidents with 
passing motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent? None are 
apparent." Unfortunately, this is not to say that they will not disagree; 
otherwise, we would all be A students in mathematics and logic. If we 
are ill-informed, confused or misled we may well fail to agree even 
though we are reasonable 
The present case is of this unfortunate sort, me jurors were led to 
draw the wrong conclusion not because it was an open question, but 
because they were not given the facts which would have led them to draw 
the correct conclusion. They were neither allowed to judge the issue of 
causation as a simple matter of fact, because they were denied access the 
relevant evidence (see Points I, II, III, VII, and IX) nor was it made clear to 
them that as a matter of logic the case was closed. 
7
 The illustrative cases in Restatement of Torts. 2d, 442 A and B, 447 and 449 are especially 
clear and illuminating on the issue at hand. (See Reply Brief, Appendix 3 and pp. 42-44.) 
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The Court of Appeals' grounds for their decision to reject the appeal 
are confusing. First it is stated that generally proximate causation is 
taken to be a determination of fact to be made by the jury. This may be 
true in general; but Ostler has argued that it is not true in this case. 
Moreover, even if it were true, the jury had already been denied access to 
relevant evidence and could not make the determination. The Court of 
Appeals' decision does not address this argument. 
Second the Court of Appeals states that '"proximate cause' is one of 
the essential elements of a negligence action" (Opinion, p. 10). This 
implies that without proximate causation, one cannot find negligence. 
But, this supports Ostler's claim, and cannot, therefore, count as a reason 
for denying that appeal. It is perfectly opaque why the Court of Appeals 
makes this citation. What follows on p. 10 of the Opinion is equally 
unmotivated. It seems correct, but neither adds to nor contradicts any of 
Ostler's arguments or contentions. In short, the entire section on p. 10 
stands as an enigma in the Court of Appeals' reasoning. 
Conclusions 
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion 
could have been endorsed by three judges. I can only conclude that in 
reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account 
many important aspects of the arguments made in the appeal; at several 
points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is beside the point and fails to 
address the arguments made in the appeal. Due to time pressures or 
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at 
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems 
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors 
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a 
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they 
deserved and required. 
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